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OBTAINING RELIEF FROM FEDERAL FIREARMS
DISABILITIES: DID CONGRESS REALLY SUSPEND THE
RELIEF AVAILABLE TO FELONS THROUGH
APPROPRIATIONS ACTS?*
This Note explores the current intercircuit conflict
surrounding relief from federal firearms disabilities.
Congress has prohibited funding to the Bureau of Alco-
hol, Tobacco, and Firearms to act upon any application
filed by a felon for relief. The circuits are in conflict as
to what in fact Congress intended to accomplish through
these appropriations acts with relation to the relief stat-
ute. This Note sets out the conflict and recommends a
proposal that is consistent with historic congressional
concerns about the relief statute and would reconcile the
conflict.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, felons are prohibited from possessing firearms.'
However, in 1965, Congress statutorily established a way for convicted
This Note, by student author Ronald C. Griffin, is the recipient of the OKLAHOMA CITY
UNivERsrrY LAW REVIEW Outstanding Note Award for 1998.
1. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994).
It shall be unlawful for any person-(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; . . . to ship or
transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any
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felons to obtain relief from this disability3 Under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c)'s
scheme, a person prohibited from firearms possession may apply to the
Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("BATE") for
relief from the firearms possession disability? The BATF has the author-
ity to either grant or deny an application for relief Should the BATF
deny an application for relief, the applicant may seek judicial review of
the denial in federal district court? When reviewing a denial by the
BATF, the district court is allowed to examine evidence outside the ad-
ministrative record.6
In the 1993 Treasury Department Appropriations Act, Congress
barred funding for the BATF to investigate or act upon applications for
relief from federal firearms disabilities.7 Since 1993, each fiscal year's
appropriations act has continued to bar the BATE from acting upon ap-
plications for relief The BATF's refusal to act has caused some appli-
cants to seek relief in the judicial system'
firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
Id.
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 910 (Supp. H 1965) (repealed 1968); see also 18 U.S.C. § 925(c)
(1994) (providing the current relief provision)..
A person who is prohibited from possessing.. . firearms or ammunition may make
application to the Secretary for relief from the disabilities imposed by Federal laws
with respect to the ... possession of firearms, and the Secretary may grant such re-
lief if it is established to his satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the dis-
ability, and the applicant's record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not
be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the
relief would not be contrary to the public interest. Any person whose application for
relief from disabilities is denied by the Secretary may file petition with the United
States district court for the district in which he resides for a judicial review of such
denial. The court may in its discretion admit additional evidence where failure to do
so would result in a miscarriage ofjustice.
18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (emphasis added). The Secretary of Treasury has delegated this
authority to the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. See 271C.F.R.
§ 178.144 (1997).
3. See 27 C.F.R. § 178.144.
4. See id.
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).
6. See id.
7. See Treasury Department Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-393, 106 Stat.
1729, 1732 (1992).
8. See Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
61, 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (Il1 Stat.) 1272, 1277 (1997); Omnibus Consolidated Appro-
priations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 3009, 3009-319
(1996); Treasury Department Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-52, 109 Stat.
468, 471 (1995); Treasury Department Appropriations Act, 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-329,
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Currently, the circuit courts are in conflict as to whether the appro-
priations acts have deprived federal district courts of subject matter juris-
diction over relief claims.'0 The Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits agree
that federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over these
claims." In addition, all three circuits agree that the appropriations acts
have suspended something with relation to 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). 2 Exactly
what was suspended is another question. The Fifth Circuit held that Con-
gress'. through the appropriations acts, suspended the relief provided in
18 U.S.C. § 925(c) for individuals.', The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
failure to appropriate funds suspended that part of 18 U.S.C. § 925(c)
which was affected. 4 And the Tenth Circuit, interpreted the appropria-
tions acts as suspending the BATF's jurisdictional grant in 18 U.S.C. §
925(c).5 On the other hand, the Third Circuit has concluded that the ap-
propriations acts have not deprived district courts of subject matter juris-
diction over relief claims. 6 In addition, the Third Circuit construed the
BATF's non-action as an undue delay, thereby excusing applicants from
exhausting all administrative remedies that allow them to seek judicial
review."' The background section of this Note will provide relevant his-
tory of federal firearms legislation leading up to the current issue caused
by the appropriations acts. The Note will then thematically separate how
the circuits have dealt with the issues the appropriations acts have cre-
ated. Recognizing the current conflict, the next section of this Note will
offer a proposal that will reconcile the circuits and is consistent with
congressional concerns expressed in the relief statute and the appropria-
tions acts. In light of the foregoing discussion, this Note will conclude
with a critical analysis of the circuit courts' opinions.
108 Stat. 2382, 2385 (1994); Treasury Department Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-123, 107 Stat. 1226, 1228-29 (1993); Treasury Department Appropriations Act,
1993, Pub. L. No. 102-393, 106 Stat. 1729, 1732 (1992).
9. See Owen v. Magaw, 122 F.3d 1350, 1352 (10th Cir. 1997); Burtch v. United States
Dep't of the Treasury, 120 F.3d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. McGill, 74
F.3d 64, 65 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 77 (1996); Rice v. United States
Dep't of the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 68 F.3d 702, 704 (3d Cir. 1995).
10. See Owen, 122 F.3d at 1352; Burtch, 120 F.3d at 1090; McGill, 74 F.3d at 66; Rice,
68 F.3d at 706-07.
11. See Owen, 122 F.3d at 1354; Burtch, 120 F.3d at 1090; McGill, 74 F.3d at 67.
12. See Owen, 122 F.3d at 1353; Burtch, 120 F.3d at 1090; McGill, 74 F.3d at 67.
13. See McGill, 74 F.3d at 68.
14. See Burtch, 120 F.3d at 1090.
15. See Owen, 122 F.3d at 1353.
16. See Rice, 68 F.3d at 707.
17. See id. at 710.
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II. BACKGROUND: HISTORY OF FEDERAL FIREARMS LEGISLATION
National firearms legislation can be traced back to the early 1930s.8
During this time, the public became concerned about increased criminal
activity. 9 As a result, the Department of Justice proposed2 and Congress
enacted the National Firearms Act of 19342 The crux of the legislation
dealt with applying a sales tax to firearms manufacturers and dealers.' If
a dealer or manufacturer failed to pay the tax, the "firearm could not be
shipped in interstate commerce."23 In addition, the Act made it a crime
for a person to possess a firearm that had been sold without applying the
sales tax.24
Not long after the National Firearms Act, Congress again found it
necessary to enact further legislation to shore up perceived shortcomings
of the 1934 Act.25 In 1938, Congress enacted the Federal Firearms Act.26
Unlike the previous Act, the Federal Firearms Act "was based squarely
upon the interstate commerce clause. 7 The relevant provisions of this
Act required gun dealers and manufactures to obtain a license in order to
transport or sale arms that traveled in interstate commerce, 8 made it un-
lawful for convicted persons to possess a firearm that had traveled in
interstate commerce.a 9 and authorized revocation of a license by the Sec-
retary of Treasury for any violation of the Act?' However, the licensee
could appeal the revocation and pay for a continuance bond, thereby
continuing business until the appeal was heard?' In essence, therefore,
the Federal Firearms Act was the first statute to deny firearm possession
18. See National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (current version at 26
U.S.C. §§ 5801, 5841, 5861, 5871 (1994)).
19. See David T. Hardy, The Firearms Owners' Protection Act: A Historical and Legal
Perspective, 17 CuMB. L. REV. 585, 590 (1986-1987).
20. See id. at 591.
21. See National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (current version at 26
U.S.C. §§ 5801, 5841, 5861, 5871 (1994)).
22. See §§ 2-3, 48 Stat. 1236.
23. Hardy, supra note 19, at 592.
24. See § 6, 48 Stat. at 1238.
25. See Hardy, supra note 19, at 593.
26. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 901-909 (1964) (repealed 1968).
27. Hardy, supra note 14, at 594.
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 902(a) (1964) (repealed 1968).
29. See id. § 902(f). The relevant portion of the section provided: "It shall be unlawful
for any person who has been convicted of a crime of violence or is a fugitive from justice
to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate
or foreign commerce ... " Id. (footnote omitted).
30. See id. § 903(c).
31. See id.
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privileges to felons and to disable gun dealers in violation of the Act.
"The 1934 and 1938 Acts comprised the substance of federal firearm law
for the next three decades. 32
In 1965, Congress amended the Federal Firearms Act 3  The amend-
ment allowed convicted felons to make an application to the Secretary of
the Treasury for relief from disabilities incurred from the Federal Fire-
arms Act.14 The Secretary could grant relief provided "it [was] estab-
lished to his satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the conviction,
and the applicant's record and reputation, [were] such that the applicant
[would] not be likely to conduct his operations in an unlawful manner,
and that the granting of relief would not be contrary to the public inter-
est. '35 In addition, the amendment not only allowed a licensee to make an
application for relief but also allowed the licensee to continue operations
pending action on his application for relief?6 In. other words, the amend-
ment does away with the continuance bond that formerly had to be paid.
Two additional Acts made up the next major federal firearms legis-
lation: The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 ("Safe
Streets Act") and the Gun Control Act of 1968 ("Gun Control Act"). 7
"[T]he two statutes [are] known collectively as the Gun Control Act of
1968."3 The legislative history and the Acts themselves "cover[] a com-
plex legislative reality," 39 to say the least. For present purposes, it is suf-
ficient to note that the Safe Streets Act amended title 18 of the United
States Code by inserting a new chapter-chapter 44 O Under section 902
of the Safe Streets Act, Congress prohibited three categories of individu-
als from possession of firearms: fugitives from justice, those indicted for
an offense punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, and those
convicted of such an offense. Section 902 allowed convicted felons to
32. Hardy, supra note 19, at 594-95.




37. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82
Stat. 197 (1968) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930 (1994)); Gun Control Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930
(1994)). The name used when referring to 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930 is the Gun Control Act
of 1968. In realty, however, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
created 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1970) (amended in 1968 and
1986).
38. Hardy, supra note 19, at 595.
39. Id.
40. See § 902, 82 Stat. at 226.
41. See § 902, 82 Stat. at 230-31.
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obtain relief from firearms possession disabilities in a manner similar to
the 1965 amendment.42 However, in order for a convicted felon to seek
relief, the underlying conviction that caused the disability had to have
been for a violation of one of the provisions in the new chapter.3
The Gun Control Act made minor changes to the relief provisions.
Under section 102 of the Gun Control Act, relief could now be sought for
disabilities incurred by any federal law, not just chapter 44 a In addition,
the Gun Control Act revised the standard for granting relief to
applicants. 4
In 1986, Congress once again found it necessary to enact additional
legislation concerning firearms and enacted the Firearms Owners' Pro-
tection Act ("FOPA").47 Specifically, Congress made substantial changes
concerning prohibition and relief provisions. The most significant
changes occurred in the relief from disabilities provision in 18 U.S.C. §
925(c). 49 The relief provisions enacted subsequent to 1965 applied to a
narrow class of persons: those barred from gun ownership by reason of
conviction."0 FOPA expanded the categories of who is eligible to make
application for relief.5 ' Congress accomplished this by amending the re-
lief provision so that any person prohibited from possessing firearms
may now seek relief."2
42. Compare § 902, 82 Stat. at 233 (providing the relief exceptions), with 15 U.S.C. §
910 (Supp. 111965) (repealed 1968) (creating the first relief from disabilities statute).
43. See § 902, 82 Stat. at 233.




47. See Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 1, 100 Stat. 449 (1986)
(current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930 (1994)). Additional legislation is required to
reaffirm the intent of the Congress, as expressed in section 101 of the Gun Control Act of
1968, that
it is not the purpose of this title to place any undue or unnecessary Federal restric-
tions or burdens on law-abiding citizens with respect to the acquisition, possession,
or use of firearms appropriate to the purpose of hunting, trapshooting, target shoot-
ing, personal protection, or any other lawful activity, and that this title is not in-
tended to discourage or eliminate the private ownership or use of firearms by law-
abiding citizens for lawful purposes.
Id. (quoting § 101, 82 Stat. at 1213-14).
48. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 925 (1994).
49. See § 925(c).
50. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).
52. See id.
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In addition, FOPA made express provisions for judicial review of re-
lief denial by the BATF.53 "A right to review had previously been recog-
nized, but on a very narrow basis."'54 Congress contemplated an active
district court role in evaluating eligibility for relief because the Act al-
lows the district court to admit additional evidence to avoida miscarriage
of justice." "The delineation of these unique and practical measures un-
derlines an intent that the review secure actual justice in each case.5 6
From 1993 until present, Congress has withheld funding from the
BATF so that it cannot act upon relief applications 7 However, Congress
did reinstate funding for the BATF to act upon applications made by
corporations in 1994 and has continued to do so through the present5 8
The circuit courts are in disagreement as to the availability of relief in
light of the appropriations acts, and the circuit courts are in disagreement
as to whether district courts have subject matter jurisdiction to hear evi-
dence from applicants and grant relief.59
III. COMPETING APPROACHES ADOPTED BY THE CIRCUIT COURTS
A. Suspension Approach
In United States v. McGill, the Fifth Circuit held that Congress sus-
pended relief provided for individuals in 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) through ap-
propriations acts. °
Kenneth W. McGill ("McGill") pled guilty to making a false state-
ment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1014 and filing a false tax return pursuant
to 26 U.S.C. § 7206.61 McGill received two years probation in April
53. See id.
54. Hardy, supra note 19, at 644.
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).
56. Hardy, supra note 19, at 645.
57. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
58. See Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
61, 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (111 Stat.) 1272, 1277 (1997); Omnibus Consolidated Appro-
priations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 3009, 3009-319
(1996); Treasury Department Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-52, 109 Stat.
468, 471 (1995); Treasury Department Appropriations Act, 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-329,
108 Stat. 2382, 2385 (1994); Treasury Department Appropriations Act, 1994 Pub. L. No.
103-123, 107 Stat. 1226, 1228-29 (1993).
59. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
60. See 74 F.3d 64, 68 (5th Cir. 1996).
61. See id. at 65.
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1993.62 McGill obtained an early release from probation in September
1994.63
McGill requested information from the BATF about applying for re-
lief from the 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) firearms disabilities." The BATF in-
formed McGill that it no longer accepted applications for relief from
disabilities because Congress had denied funding for the program 5
McGill then filed an application for removal of his federal firearms dis-
abilities with the district court." The district court dismissed the applica-
tion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.67
The Fifth Circuit's discussion focused on finding what Congress in-
tended to accomplish with the appropriations acts. The court of appeals
began its review with the statement "[a]lthough we doubt that the district
court has original jurisdiction to consider an application to remove the
Federal firearm disability, we pretermit that question because it is clear
to us that Congress suspended the relief provided by 18 U.S.C. §
925(c)."' The court recognized Congress' power "to amend, suspend or
repeal a statute by an appropriations bill, as long as it does so clearly."9
Therefore, the issue for the court of appeals was whether Congress in-
tended for the appropriations acts to suspend 18 U.S.C. § 925(c)!0
The court of appeals set out a brief history of the Gun Control Act,
18 U.S.C. § 922,.and 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).7' It then discussed the district
courts' role in relation to 18 U.S.C. § 925(c),72 acknowledging that 18
U.S.C. § 925(c) allowed district courts to "admit additional evidence in
extraordinary circumstances.' 73 However, relying on the legislative his-
tory of the 1986 amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that Congress intended for district courts to review the BATF's
denial under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard! 4 In the court's view







68. Id. at 65-66.
69. Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
70. See id.
71. See id.; see also supra notes 33-56 and accompanying text.
72. See McGill, 74 F.3d at 66-67.
73. Id. at 66.
74. See id.
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privileges because the district court's review is limited to only the
BATF's denial and not conducting a de novo review of the application."'
The Fifth Circuit next turned to the appropriations acts to discern
Congress' intent on suspension! 6 The court set out the relevant language
from the 1993 Appropriations Act for the Treasury Department." "That
none of the funds appropriated herein shall be available to investigate or
act upon applications for relief from Federal firearms disabilities under
18 U.S.C. § 925(c)." In addition, it examined a report to the Senate
where the Appropriations Committee explained why it wanted to prohibit
funds for the BATF to act on 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) applications:
[u]nder the relief procedure, [B]ATF officials are required to
determine whether a convicted felon, including persons con-
victed of violent felonies or serious drug offenses, can be en-
trusted with a firearm. After [B]ATF agents spend many hours
investigating a particular applicant[,] they must determine
whether or not that applicant is still a danger to public safety.
This is a very difficult and subjective task which could have
devastating consequences for innocent citizens if the wrong deci-
sion is made. The Committee believes that the approximately 40
man-years spent annually to investigate and act upon these in-
vestigations and applications would be better utilized to crack
down on violent crime. Therefore, the Committee has included
language in the bill which prohibits the use of funds for [B]ATF
to investigate and act upon applications from relief from Federal
firearms disabilities.79
The court construed the withholding of funds to the BATE along with the
Senate Report as Congress' intention to suspend the relief provided in 18
U.S.C. § 925(c). 0 The court noted that it could not "conceive that Con-
gress intended to transfer the burden and responsibility of investigating
the applicant's fitness to possess firearms from the [B]ATF to the federal
courts, which do not have the manpower or expertise to investigate or
evaluate these applications."'"
75. See id.
76. See id. at 67.
77. See id.
78. Treasury Department Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-393, 106 Stat.
1729, 1732 (1992).
79. McGill, 74 F.3d at 67 (quoting S. REP. No. 102-353, at 19 (1992)).
80. See McGill, 74 F.3d at 67.
81. Id.
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In addition, the court found it relevant that the original appropria-
tions act prohibited funding across the board for investigations;
82
whereas, in the subsequent acts, Congress restored funding to the BATF
to investigate applications from corporations but continued to prohibit
funding for investigations on individuals. 3 The court found that "[i]f
Congress thought the courts were considering applications for relief un-
der § 925(c), this restoration of funds to provide relief for corporations
would have been unnecessary."' Therefore, the court of appeals con-
cluded that the appropriations acts suspended 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) relief to
individuals."
In Burtch v. United States Department of the Treasury, the Ninth
Circuit held that the failure of the BATF to rule on applications for resto-
rations of firearms privileges was not a denial of applications subject to
judicial review."
From 1984 to 1987, Robert F. Burtch ("Burtch") was convicted of
four felonies. 7 As a result of these convictions Burtch was prohibited
from firearms possession.8 In January 1994, Burtch requested an appli-
cation for relief from his firearms disabilities from the BATF.89 The
BATE notified Burtch that it was prohibited from acting upon these types
of applications.9° The BATF informed Burtch to contact its office if Con-
gress ever restored funding to act upon these applications.9
In June 1995, Burtch filed a petition in federal district court seeking
removal of the firearms disabilities.92 Burtch alleged that his application
was denied and requested the district court provide him relief from his
firearms possession disabilities?3 The district court dismissed Burtch's
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.'
The Ninth Circuit centered its discussion primarily on statutory in-
terpretation. The court of appeals acknowledged the intercircuit conflict
around this issue;95 however, the court framed the question as one of
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 67-68.
85. See id.
86. See 120 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1997).
87. See id. at 1088.
88. See id.






95. See id. at 1090.
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statutory interpretation?' In doing so, the court determined the starting
point was the language of the statute itself.97 The court set out and ex-
amined the relevant language of 18 U.S.C. § 925(c)?8
The court of appeals interpreted the statute as "not authoriz[ing] the
district court to build a record from scratch or make discretionary policy
determinations in the first instance if the Secretary does not. In the con-
text of the entire statute, the word 'denial' means an adverse determina-
tion on the merits and does not include a refusal to act. '" Therefore, the
court held the statute meant what it said."° In addition, the court inter-
preted the failure to appropriate funds to the BATE to conduct investiga-
tions "as a suspension of that part of section 925(c) which is affected."'0 '
.In summary, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Fifth Circuit's conclu-
sion, but because the statute was clear on its face, the Ninth Circuit de-
termined that it did not need to examine legislative history.'
In Owen v. Magaw, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court did
not have subject matter jurisdiction to review the BATF's refusal to in-
vestigate or act upon applications for relief from firearms possession
disabilities because there had not been a denial by the BATF?03
In 1993, David Owen ("Owen") was convicted on two counts of fil-
ing false income tax returns." Owen was sentenced to one year and one
day for each conviction.' Upon release from prison, Owen inquired with
the BATT about the application process for obtaining restoration of his
firearms privileges."o The Director of the BATF responded by letter "that
due to the restrictions contained in the Treasury appropriations bill, the
BATF could not take any administrative steps toward investigating
Owen and determining whether he should be allowed to carry a
firearm.' 0 7
Owen filed suit in the district court seeking review of the BATF's re-






101. Id.; see also United States v. Oldroyd, No. 97-30354, 1998 WL 55402, at *2 (9th
Cir. July 28, 1998) (following the Burtch precedent).
102. See id.
103. See 122 F.3d 1350, 1354 (10th Cir. 1997).




108. See id. at 1351-52.
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the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.'" The BATF argued that it
had not denied an application by Owen because it was precluded from
acting or investigating upon such requests by lack of appropriated funds;
therefore, the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction."' The
district court agreed and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction."'
The Tenth Circuit phrased the question as whether district courts
have subject matter jurisdiction to review the refusal of the BATF to
investigate or act upon an application for relief from federal firearm dis-
abilities when the BATF is prohibited from doing so by appropriations
acts." The Tenth Circuit set out the way the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Cir-
cuit Courts had dealt with the question." 3
Owen's argument on appeal was similar to McGill's arguments in
the Fifth Circuit. "[Owen's] central argument [was] that the appropria-
tions statutes are silent as to the role of the judiciary, and that there has
been no clear statement of Congress' intent to repeal the court's authority
under § 925(c) to review the treatment by the BATT of applications for
relief under the statute."" Therefore, Owen contended "that the appro-
priations statutes should not be read as having limited the role of the
courts."' '
Like the Fifth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit recognized that "'an appro-
priations act may be used to suspend or to modify prior Acts of Con-
gress.""' 6 The court believed Congress intended to suspend the BATF's
jurisdictional grant in 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) through the appropriations
acts." 7 In addition, like the Fifth Circuit, the court disagreed with the
argument that Congress had shifted the task of determining whether
privileges should be restored from the BATF to the judiciary."" The
court found that "[t]he only role for the judiciary is judicial review of a
denial of relief under § 925(c) to restore firearm privileges."" 9




113. See id. at 1352-53.
114. Id. at 1353.
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 485 F.2d 1, 9 (10th Cir. 1973)
(emphasis added)).
117. See Owen, 122 F.3d at 1353.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 1354.
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The court of appeals agreed with the Fifth Circuit's analysis of the
legislative history.20 Thus, the Tenth Circuit held that absent a denial by
the BATF, district courts are without subject matter jurisdiction.'
B. Exhaustion of Remedies Approach
In Rice v. United States Department of Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire-
arms, the Third Circuit held that the lack of appropriations to the BATF
for investigations regarding restoration of firearms privileges did not
repeal that provision of 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) or preclude judicial review 22
In addition, the Third Circuit held that exhaustion of administrative
remedies would not be required for judicial review.'
Phillip Rice ("Rice") filed an action for equitable relief to obtain
restoration of his firearms privileges from the BATE in district court!"
In 1970, Rice pled guilty in state court to several felonies involving sto-
len auto parts. 2 Rice claimed that he did not realize the felony convic-
tions deprived him of his privilege to possess firearms.2" Rice continued
to possess firearms because he hunted and collected guns.'27 In 1991,
Rice pled guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 921(g)(1).
In June 1992, Rice submitted an application to the BATF for resto-
ration of his firearm privileges.'29 In November 1992, the BATF notified
Rice by letter that it could no longer continue to process his application
for relief because of a new federal law. 30 The new federal law the letter
referred to was in fact the appropriations acts prohibiting funding to the
BATE to act upon these applications. Therefore, the action Rice filed
was for judicial review of the BATF's refusal to process his
application.''
The BATF moved to dismiss Rice's complaint.' 2 The BATF's ar-
gument in support of that position was that Rice was not entitled to judi-
120. See id. at 1354 n.1.
121. See id. at 1354.
122. See 68 F.3d 702, 707 (3d Cir. 1995).
123. See id. at 709.
124. See Rice v. United States Dep't of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 850 F. Supp.
306, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
125. See id.
126. See Rice, 68 F.3d at 705.
127. See id.
128. See Rice, 850 F. Supp. at 307.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See Rice, 68 F.3d at 706.
132. See id.
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cial review of its refusal to act on his application because it had never
finally denied the application.'33 The appropriations acts forced the
BATF to stop processing applications."4 Therefore, the BATF contended
that until there was a denial, district courts lacked subject matter juris-
diction."
The district court commented that "[i]t [was] doubtful whether the
[B]ATF may avoid judicial review under any and all circumstances sim-
ply by failing to process an application."'36 The district court found no
evidence of bad faith or arbitrary or capricious conduct on the part of the
agency; no undue delay; no funding available for the BATF to process
Rice's application; and no fault on the BATF's part.'37 Therefore, the
district court held it was without subject matter jurisdiction because the
BATF's actions did not constitute a denial under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).!
The Third Circuit's analysis focused primarily on the equity of the
appropriations acts with respect to the applicant's position. The court of
appeals held that the "district court erred in holding that Congress's
elimination of appropriations for investigating and acting on section
925(c) application deprived it subject matter jurisdiction."'39 The court
believed that the district court's order should be "analyzed in terms of a
failure to exhaust administrative remedies rather than a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction."'4 However, before the court embarked upon the
exhaustion of remedies approach, it first had to satisfy itself that the dis-
trict court had subject matter jurisdiction. 4'
The court of appeals acknowledged "Congress's exclusive power to
appropriate money and establish the jurisdiction of inferior federal
courts."'42 However, "before courts will hold that Congress has used an
appropriations act to repeal substantive legislation or preclude judicial
review of administrative action, the intention to do. so must be clearly
stated."'43 The court found that the appropriation acts failed "to show a








140. Id. at 706-07.
141. See id. at 707.
142. Id.
143. Id. (citing Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 440 (1992)).
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BATF's refusal to grant relief from firearms disabilities."'" In making
this determination, the court looked at the language contained in the 1993
appropriations act.'45 "[N]one of the funds appropriated herein shall be
available to investigate or act upon applications for relief from Federal
firearms disabilities under 18 U.S.C. 925(c).' 4 The court noted that the
next two appropriations acts extended the same language.47 The court
found it extremely important that the appropriations acts did not "ex-
pressly preclude a court from reviewing BATF's refusal to process an
application for relief."'48 Therefore, the court held that the appropriations
acts neither repealed 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) nor precluded "judicial review
of administrative decisions concerning a convict's application for resto-
ration of his firearm privileges.' 4 9 The court concluded that the district
court did have subject matter jurisdiction over Rice's action?50
The court of appeals then moved into an exhaustion of administrative
remedy analysis.'' The court of appeals relied primarily on three United
States Supreme Court cases in conducting its exhaustion analysis:
McCarthy v. Madigan;52 McKart v. United Sates;'" and Coit Independ-
ence Joint Venture v. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp."4 The
court of appeals set out several general rules and principles from these
cases concerning the exhaustion of remedies doctrine.' "The general
rule concerning exhaustion is 'that no one is entitled to judicial relief for
a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative rem-
edy has been exhausted."" 56 Deciding an exhaustion issue requires fed-
eral courts to perform a balancing test.' The court "'must balance the
interest of the individual in retaining prompt access to a federal judicial
forum""58 on the one hand, and "'countervailing institutional interests
144. Rice, 68 F.3d at 707.
145. See id.
146. Treasury Department Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-393, 106 Stat.
1729, 1732 (1992).





152. 503 U.S. 140 (1992).
153. 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
154. 489 U.S. 561 (1989).
155. See Rice, 68 F.3d at 708.
156. Id (quoting McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969)).
157. See Rice, 68 F.3d at 708 (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146 (1992)).
158. Rice, 68 F.3d at 708 (quoting McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 146).
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favoring exhaustion""'59 on the other hand. The "'[a]pplication of this
balancing principle is intensely practical."" '  Therefore, "a court may
decline 'to require exhaustion in some circumstances even where ad-
ministrative and judicial interests would counsel otherwise."""
"In McCarthy the Court described 'three broad sets of circumstances
in which the interests of the individual weigh heavily against requiring
administrative exhaustion." 6 ' The Third Circuit relied on the first ex-
ception. "[A] court is less likely to apply exhaustion when it may cause
'undue prejudice to subsequent assertion of a court action. ' 63 "One way
in which this 'undue prejudice' may occur is by an unreasonable or in-
definite time frame for administrative action. ' ' 4
In order to determine whether Rice was required to exhaust all ad-
ministrative remedies before seeking judicial review, the court applied
the balancing test to Rice. 65 The court found the indefinite delay the ap-
propriations acts imposed unreasonable."6 However, the court of appeals
did recognize two factors that favored the exhaustion requirement: "[t]he
initial determination that Rice qualifies for relief from his firearm dis-
ability involves the exercise of [the] BATF's discretion and relies on
[the] BATF's expertise.' ' 67 But, these two factors were not enough to
outweigh the court's other findings.
The court of appeals looked at the district court's express and broad
authority granted in 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) 68 and the relevant portions of the
appropriations acts to determine that Rice was excused from exhausting
all administrative remedies in order to invoke judicial review.!9 Had the
statute not given district courts the authority to receive independent evi-
dence when necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice, the court would
have been hesitant to excuse exhaustion. 7' The court believed "Congress
did not intend to apply rigidly the doctrine of exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies in this context because it gave the district courts discretion




162. Id. (quoting McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 146-47).
163. Id.
164. Id. (quoting McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 147).
165. See Rice, 68 F.3d at 709.
166. See id.
167. Id.
168. See id. "[S]ection 925(c) gives district courts [authority] to receive independent
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avoid a miscarriage of justice."''
The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the district
court with instructions.' The district court, in its discretion, was to de-
termine whether the facts Rice alleged indicated apotentialfor a miscar-
riage ofjustice."3 If the district court found in the affirmative, it was to
decide based on all the evidence whether Rice had met his burden of
satisfying the standard set out in 18 U.S.C. § 925(c)."
171. Id.
172. See id. at 709-10.
173. See id. at 710.
174. See id. On remand, the district court reinstated Rice's firearms possession privi-
lege. See Rice v. United States, No. CIV.A.93-6107, 1997 WL 48945, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 30, 1997). See also United States v. Quintiliani, No. 75-438, 1997 WL 430973, at *1
(E.D. Pa. July 15, 1997); United States v. Mullis, No.CR. 94-20297 MI/A, 1998 WL
957334, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 9, 1998).
In Quintiliani, the court recognized that under Rice it must first determine whether the
facts alleged in the applicant's petition indicate a potential for a miscarriage ofjustice if
the petition were to be denied by the BATF. See id. at *2. "If so, the [c]ourt should permit
[the applicant] to submit evidence of his fitness to have his firearms privileges restored."
Id. Then, the court should decide whether the applicant satisfies the standards of 18
U.S.C. § 925(c). See id
The court found "that the allegations contained in Quintiliani's Petition, if true, con-
stitute a potential for a miscarriage of justice were his petition to be denied." Id. There-
fore, the court ordered that Quintiliani be given an opportunity to submit evidence in
favor of his application. See id. Similar to this Note's recommendation in Section IV. C
infra, the court advised Quintiliani that he "should be prepared to present at a hearing the
same type of evidence that would be gathered in a BATF field investigation." Id. There-
fore, the court ordered Quintiliani to submit the information that is requested on the
BATF application for relief, including a list of witnesses and their expected testimony.
See id.
In Mullis, however, the Sixth Circuit has yet to confront the issue of what affect the
appropriations acts have had on the relief statute. See Mullis, 1998 WL 957334, at *1.
Thus the parties in Mullis presented the district court with the approaches taken by the
Third Circuit and the Fifth Circuit. (Obviously the United States advocated the approach
taken by the Fifth Circuit, and Mr. Mullis advocated the approach taken by the Third
Circuit.) See id. at *2-3. After analyzing both approaches, the district court held "that
Congress' continued purposeful nonfunding since 1992 of 18 U.S.C. § 925 (c) ... con-
stitute[d] unavailability of an administrative remedy, and therefore [the] Defendant may
petition [the] Court for relief." Id. at *3. The court rejected the government's argument
that there was a "special problem" presented when an entity other than the ATF conducts
the investigation under § 925 (c) on two grounds: "First, the statute itself grants federal
courts judicial review of the Director's denial of an application, and expressly permits the
consideration of any additional evidence deemed necessary by the Court to prevent a
miscarriage of justice"; Second, the court noted that "this argument ignores the multitude
of ways ... that a state felon may obtain restoration of his federal firearm rights by op-
eration of state law and without the involvement of any special ATF competency." Id.
Therefore, the court found that it would be "inconsistent with the totality of the statu-
tory scheme to hold that federal courts are incompetent to make a case-by-case determi-
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IV. A PROPOSAL TO RECONCILE THE CONFLICT
In light of appropriations acts prohibiting the BATF from acting
upon 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) applications, three circuits have determined that
federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over relief claims.
The three circuits agree that the appropriations acts have suspended 18
U.S.C. § 925(c). However, each of the three circuits has found different
parts of 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) suspended. The Fifth Circuit found that Con-
gress intended to suspend the relief available under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).
The Ninth Circuit interpreted the failure to appropriate investigatory
funds as a suspension of that part of 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) which was af-
fected. The Tenth Circuit found that Congress chose to suspend the
BATF's jurisdictional grant in 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) through the appropria-
tions acts.
On the other hand, the Third Circuit has found that the appropria-
tions acts have not worked to deprive district courts of subject matter
jurisdiction over relief from disabilities claims. The Third Circuit used an
exhaustion of remedy approach and found that because of the appropria-
tions acts, applicants need not exhaust all administrative remedies before
seeking judicial review. However, neither the suspension approach nor
the exhaustion approach is fully consistent with the congressional
scheme of 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).
nation regarding the removal of the federal disability after development of a complete
record ..... Id. at *4.
After finding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction, the court referred
the petition to a magistrate judge to develop a record, make factual findings, and make a
recommendation regarding the relief sought by Mr. Mullis. See id. The court instructed
the magistrate, again consistent with this Note's recommendation in Section IV.C, that:
In developing the record, the Magistrate Judge should consider all of the evi-
dence that the ATF would have required an applicant to submit pursuant to 27
C.F.R. § 178.144, including: a written statement from each of three (3) refer-
ences, who are not related to defendant by blood or marriage and have known
Defendant for at least three (3) years, recommending the granting of relief;
written consent to examine and obtain copies of records and to receive state-
ments and information regarding the Defendant's background, including rec-
ords, statements and other information concerning employment, medical his-
tory, military service, and criminal record; and a copy of the indictment or in-
formation on which the defendant was convicted, the judgment of conviction or
record of any plea of nolo contendere or plea of guilty or finding of guilt by the
court. The Magistrate Judge should also consider any additional evidence out-
side the scope of those regulations "where failure to do so would result in a
miscarriage of justice."
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Congress intended to modify 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) through suspension
of funding to the BATF prohibiting it from acting or investigating upon
relief applications. Because Congress intended to modify 18 U.S.C. §
925(c), federal district courts would have original jurisdiction to review
relief applications. Thus, district courts could either grant or deny relief.
A modification approach takes into account what the appropriations
acts have in fact suspended and what Congress has left in place. Con-
gress has suspended the BATF (with respect to individuals) from the
relief equation. And because the BATF is no longer involved in the relief
process, the judiciary's role has been modified from one involving re-
view of BATF denials to one involving the ability to either grant or deny
relief. Congress has left the relief available under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c)
intact. In order to obtain relief, an applicant must now file a petition for
relief in federal district court. Based upon the evidence introduced, the
district court can either grant or deny relief. To prove Congress intended
to modify 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), a more complete examination of the leg-
islative history surrounding the relief statute and the appropriations acts
must be conducted.
A. Relief Provision: Moving from the Administrative to the Judicial
The legislative history behind the relief provisions shows that Con-
gress recognized that not all felonies are created equal. Beginning with
the original relief provision in 1965, it appears that Congress believed the
strict application of the Federal Firearms Act worked to disadvantage
some individuals who posed no danger to the public by reason of firearm
possession.7 The Committee on Ways and Means submitted a report to
the House of Representatives which stated in part:
Under present law, conviction of a felony (offense punishable by
imprisonment for more than 1 year) automatically deprives the
convicted person (including a corporation) of the right to have
any dealing with any firearm or ammunition in interstate or for-
eign commerce. No consideration can be given to any circum-
stances which might cause a judge to properly mitigate or even
suspend the punishment. Nor may consideration be given to the
fact that the crime might be wholly unrelated to firearms and to
the disability imposed by the Federal Firearms ActP 6
175. See H.R. REP. No. 89-708, at 1 (1965).
176. Id.
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Thereafter, Congress amended the Federal Firearms Act by providing a
relief provision.' The relief provision incorporated these concerns ex-
pressed by the House Report. However, instead of the judiciary making
the determination on whether to grant relief, Congress empowered the
Secretary of the Treasury with the task. In addition, the relief provision
provided the Secretary with a broad and subjective standard for either
granting or denying relief.' This suggests that originally Congress was
relying upon the Secretary's investigatory capabilities and its expertise to
determine whether an applicant should be granted relief.
In 1986, the Judiciary Committee reviewed proposed legislation that
would amend the relief provision and reported to the House of Repre-
sentatives.'79 The proposed legislation would broaden the relief from
disabilities.8 0 The committee considered this to be a positive feature of
the legislation and reported: "[t]his section reforms the provisions of 18
U.S.C. 925(c) to improve the ability of the deserving members of the
public to obtain relief from the legal disqualification from firearms own-
ership (possession or receipt)."'' Thereafter, Congress reinforced its
intent to relieve sportsmen, hunters, and other deserving members of the
public from firearms disabilities by enacting the Firearms Owners' Pro-
tection Act.'82 In addition, to ensure these congressional intentions, the
Act expressly provided for judicial review of relief denials by the BATF.
This history establishes three things: (1) Congress realized that not
all persons convicted of felonies should be denied firearms privileges
forever; (2) Congress provided the Secretary (BATF) with the ability to
reinstate firearms privileges because of, what appears to be, its investi-
gatory background and its expertise; and (3) Congress revamped the re-
lief provision allowing the judiciary to give the final word on the appro-
priateness of a denial by the BATF. Therefore, it is an accurate interpre-
tation that Congress saw deficiencies in the way the BATF handled ap-
plications for relief from firearm disabilities and created a more expan-
sive judicial involvement in the relief process.
B. The Real Reason for the Funding Cuts
Since 1993, the funding cuts have not allowed the BATF to take any
action toward relief applications. Thus, individuals are submitting appli-
177. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
178. See id.
179. See H.R. REP. No. 99-495, at 1 (1986).
180. See id.
181. Id. at28.
182. See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
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cations for relief, but no action is taken. The majority of applicants who
do seek judicial review of the BATF's refusal to act have their actions
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. These affects on the
relief statute create a tension with congressional substantive views to-
ward providing relief to deserving members of the public. However,
there is an explanation harmonizing these apparently disparate views.
The underlying basis for the funding cut was the amount of money
the BATF spent every year on relief applications with little to show for
it. The Fifth and Tenth Circuit Courts used, as legislative history, a 1992
Senate Report as conclusive evidence that Congress intended to suspend
18 U.S.C. § 925(c). However, the courts did not review any congres-
sional hearings that were the basis for the statement found in the Senate
Report.
During a 1993 Senate subcommittee hearing, the Director of the
BATF responded to questions pertaining to the relief provisions"8 When
questioned by Senator DeConcini about how the BATF processes appli-
cations for relief, the Director, Stephen Higgins, testified:
[o]nce we get those applications.., we will send th[em] out with
one of our special agents for an investigation. They will conduct
a background investigation, check the court records, check police
sources in that particular area where the individual lives, check
neighbors, employers, references and people who weren't given
as references, and then make a report.
The report is an indication in the judgment of the agent and
then it goes up the line through review, as to whether or not that
person, if given the right to have a gun, would pose a threat to
the community. We look at the kind of crime the individual was
convicted of; was it a violent crime or was it a white-collar-type-
crime and other things, and then what has been their record since
they were released from probation, parole or prison.
If we are convinced that the individual does not pose a threat
to society, then we would approve the relief from disability!"
Mr. Higgins also testified, "every year about 3000 to 4000 people ex-
press an interest in [applying for relief]. ' " However, only about 1000
183. See Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal
Year 1993: Hearings on H.R. 5488 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appro-
priations, 102d Cong. 69 (1993).
184. Id.
185. Id.
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are actually sent in and found eligible to conduct investigations on. 86 In
addition, the BATF requested $3.7 million to fund the relief from dis-
abilities program for the 1993 fiscal year."7 According to these numbers,
the BATF was spending an average of $3700 per investigation. There-
fore, an intent that Congress wanted to reduce the amount of money the
BATF was spending on very few applications per year can be interpreted
from the hearings.
It is this Note's position that a clear congressional intent can be con-
strued from this legislative history that is consistent with the rationale
used by all the circuits. This Note acknowledges that Congress did intend
suspension-suspension of funding to the BATF to act upon applica-
tions, not suspension of the relief contained in 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). Rather
than suspension of 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) through lack of funding to the
BATF, this Note submits Congress modified 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) through
the suspension of funding to the BATF. This position is consistent with
congressional intentions expressed in the legislative history, the relief
provision, and the appropriations acts.
Congressional concern appeared to be with the BATE's inefficient
and wasteful administrative review process rather than a desire to curb
the availability of relief itself. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits recognized
that Congress could suspend, modify, or amend a statute through the use
of appropriations acts if it did so clearly. The legislative history shows
that Congress has modified the relief provision found in 18 U.S.C. §
925(c) a number of times. Each time Congress has done so because of
concern toward those persons who hunt and collect guns in a lawful
manner but are denied possession of firearms because of unrelated felony
convictions. Given the genuine concerns Congress has expressed to those
persons who have been denied gun possession because of unrelated
criminal convictions, it is consistent to infer that Congress withheld
funding to the BATF for economic reasons, thereby deleting administra-
tive action from the statute but otherwise leaving the relief available.
This rationale might be better explained in an illustration. Suppose
there is a room, in this room is justice; however, before a person can get
into the room to obtain justice, he must first unlock the door. The only
person with keys to the door, is the BATF. Congress has taken the keys
from the BATF but left justice in the room. However, it is still possible
to get into the room and obtain justice because the judiciary has a master
key to all rooms where justice lies, it just has to find it. The preceding
illustration is what happened to 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). In taking away the
186. See id.
187. See id. at 71.
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keys, Congress eliminated the BATF from the process of granting relief.
However, in doing so, Congress modified the situation because justice
still remained in the room, but now the judiciary must open the door.
And, there is a way the judiciary can open the door-original jurisdic-
tion.
By accepting that Congress intended to modify 18 U.S.C. § 925(c),
relief claims can now be brought in federal district court, and the federal
district court will have original jurisdiction over the action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1337(a).8 s This statute provides: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any
Act of Congress regulating commerce ... ."'" The relief provision is part
of the Gun Control Act, which is an Act regulating commerce!' This
would now satisfy the jurisdictional concerns expressed by the circuit
courts. Instead of looking at the jurisdictional problem as one of subject
matter jurisdiction to review inaction by the BATF, having found a
modification of 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) the correct analysis should be one of
invoking original jurisdiction over the matter.
C. Modification or Exhaustion: The Same Ends, But Different Means
The equitable concerns addressed in determining whether to excuse a
party from exhausting all administrative remedies are implicit in a modi-
fication result. Professor Davis best summarizes the policy behind ex-
cusing exhaustion by advocating a four-prong test for courts to use as a
guide in determining whether exhaustion is appropriate' 9' The test re-
quires balancing four considerations:
(1) the extent of injury to petitioner from requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies, (2) the degree of difficulty of merits is-
sue the court is asked to resolve, (3) the extent to which judicial
resolution of merits issue will be aided by agency fact-finding or
application of expertise, and (4) the extent to which the agency
has already completed its fact-finding or applied its expertise.
The injury inflicted upon persons eligible to apply for relief weighs
heavily against the historic congressional attitudes toward providing re-
188. See 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1994).
189. Id.
190. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994).
191. See 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 15.2, at 315 (3d ed. 1994).
192. Id.
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lief. Assuming a person is otherwise eligible for relief, requiring that
person to await indefinitely to have his firearms privileges restored can
cause substantial impairments to be placed upon that person that go
against congressional intentions. The person will not be able to possess a
firearm for the purposes of "hunting, trap-shooting, target shooting, per-
sonal protection, or any other lawful activity."'' These are the very
things Congress did not want to burden with undue or unnecessary fed-
eral restrictions. Therefore, given Congress' traditional position on this
issue, it is inconsistent to conclude that Congress would suspend firearms
relief to deserving individuals.
Courts will have no difficulty in deciding whether to grant or deny
an individual's relief from disabilities request. Courts will examine the
same types of evidence that the BATF used in making its determination
on whether to grant or deny relief. Before modification, the applicant had
to establish to the BATF's satisfaction that he would not "likely act in a
manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief
would not be contrary to the public interest.' In reality, the applicant
needed to satisfy only the field agent conducting the investigation that he
would not act in the manner described. The field agent then made a re-
port containing a recommendation to the Director of the BATF as to
whether relief should be granted. In order to obtain relief now, the appli-
cant will have to establish to the court, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that relief should be granted. So although there is little difficulty
in determining the merits of whether relief should be granted, the burden
of persuasion is higher when the court is determining whether to grant
relief.
A court can resolve relief issues without relying on BATT back-
ground investigations or expertise. Under a modification approach, the
burden would be on the applicant to submit evidence that he would not
act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the
relief would not be contrary to the public interest. This evidence would
include such things as the applicant's record, reputation, and the under-
lying reason for the disability. In addition, the court could require the
applicant to submit additional evidence before making its determination
on whether to grant relief.' Moreover, allowing a court to grant the re-
lief solves several concerns expressed by Congress and the circuit courts.
First, it would shift the financial burden from the government to the ap-
193. Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 1, 100 Stat. 449 (1986).
194. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).
195. See United States v. Quintiliani, No. 75-438, 1997 WL 430973, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July
15, 1997).
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plicant. The applicant would be responsible for paying court costs and
attorneys fees. Second, instead of the BATF conducting investigations on
the applicant, the applicant would have to secure all the necessary evi-
dence in order to receive relief. And, if the court deems more evidence is
needed, it will be up to the applicant to secure such evidence. Third, a
court is a better-suited forum for deciding these issues because it is adju-
dicative in nature. In addition, if the court wanted to examine how the
BATF had conducted its investigations in the past, this information is
available in the Code of Federal Regulations ' and case law. 97 There-
fore, the court can decide relief questions without the need of BATF ex-
pertise, and if investigative work needs to be done, the applicant himself
would have to conduct it.
Reinstating funding to the BATF to act upon relief applications from
corporations is not dispositive that Congress intended the prohibition of
the BATE to act upon relief applications from individuals as suspending
that portion of 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). Because Congress suspended funding
to the BATF to act upon 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) applications, the Fifth Cir-
cuit concluded that Congress intended to suspend that portion of 18
U.S.C. § 925(c) which it had previously funded. However, this action by
Congress can be explained in a way consistent with modification and not
suspension. Originally, once a corporation incurred a disability, it would
have to pay a continuance bond in order to conduct business while
awaiting the Secretary (BATF) to act upon the application. However,
Congress amended this requirement, and corporations were allowed to
operate with a disability while awaiting action by the BATF. The infer-
ence that if Congress believed the judiciary was acting on relief applica-
tions, it would not have reinstated funding for the review of corporations
is incorrect. Corporations would have no incentive to seek relief from the
judiciary because its operations never stopped as a result of the disability.
Moreover, this is a circular argument. Because there is no legislative
history on why Congress reinstated the funding, the same argument can
be made that Congress knew the judiciary was acting upon relief appli-
cations and wanted the BATF to handle corporate applications and the
judiciary to handle applications from individuals. Regardless, the fact
that Congress has provided funding to the BATF to act upon corporate
applications does not alter the analysis or conclusion that Congress modi-
fied 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) through appropriations acts.
196. See 27 C.F.R. §178.144.
197. See Smith v. Brady, 813 F. Supp. 1382, 1383-84 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (describing
BATF's investigative procedures).
1001
Oklahoma City University Law Review
The legislative history supports the position that Congress intended
to modify 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). Congress has historically expressed con-
cern toward individuals who have been denied firearm possession privi-
leges based upon nonviolent felonies. Congress increased the judiciary's
role in the relief process because of the BATF's inability to conduct fair
reviews. Congress suspended funding to the BATE because of the
amount of money it spent on relatively few applications every year.
Therefore, Congress eliminated the BATE from granting relief to indi-
viduals. However, Congress otherwise left the relief available under 18
U.S.C. § 925(c) intact.
This proposal for reconciliation is consistent with the rationales used
by the circuit courts. Congress did intend a suspension; however, it did
not intend to suspend that portion of 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) that grants relief
to individuals. Congress only intended to suspend funding to the BATF.
In addition, because the determination of whether to grant or deny relief
is now in federal district court, this proposal is also consistent with the
Third Circuit's exception from exhaustion conclusion.
D. Critical Analysis of the Circuit Courts
The Fifth and Tenth Circuits took the best approach in determining
what Congress intended with the appropriations acts. However, neither
circuit examined all of the available legislative history pertaining to the
appropriations acts and the relief provision. The two circuits conducted a
one-sided examination of the legislative history. The Fifth Circuit relied
solely on the language found in a Senate Report, where the Appropria-
tions Committee used the "40 man-years spent annually to investigate
and act upon these investigations and applications [by the BATF] would
be better utilized to crack down on violent crime,"' 8 language to con-
clude that Congress intended to suspend the relief provided in 18 U.S.C.
§ 925(c). The Fifth Circuit further noted that it could not "conceive that
Congress intended to transfer the burden and responsibility of investi-
gating the applicant's fitness to possess firearms from the [B]ATF to the
federal courts, which do not have the manpower or expertise to investi-
gate or evaluate these applications.""
The Tenth Circuit agreed with this analysis of the legislative history.
And, it too rejected the argument that Congress had shifted the task~of
determining whether privileges should be restored from the BATF to the
198. S. REP. No. 102-353, at 19 (1992); see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
199. United States v. McGill, 74 F.3d 64, 67 (5th Cir. 1996).
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judiciary.2" Rather, in the Tenth Circuit's view, the only role for the ju-
diciary was judicial review of a denial of relief by the BATF under 18
U.S.C. § 925(c).
However, the Fifth and Tenth Circuits neglected to review the legis-
lative history of the relief provision in conjunction with the legislative
history of the appropriations acts. The Court decisions cited by the cir-
cuits set out a very extensive review of legislative materials; however,
the Fifth and Tenth Circuits failed to consider the legislative history as a
whole.2"' Although it is difficult to set out a detailed review of the legis-
lative history relating to the appropriations acts, this Note has examined
the legislative history behind the relief provision in conjunction with the
legislative history, although scant, behind the appropriations acts to show
that Congress' historical attitude has been to "improve the ability of the
deserving members of the public to obtain relief from the legal disquali-
fication from firearms ownership.'" In addition, this type of review has
indicated that Congress perceived deficiencies in the way the BATF han-
dled applications for relief from firearms disabilities and created a more
expansive judicial involvement in the relief process0 3 Moreover, by ex-
amining the legislative histories side-by-side, this author has determined
that Congress intended to modify the relief provision and, because the
judiciary is a better-suited forum, intended to allow the district courts to
either grant or deny relief pursuant to original jurisdiction. Therefore,
had either circuit conducted a more detailed analysis of the legislative
history pertaining to the relief provision and the appropriations acts, they
would have been able to discern a more complete congressional intention
to modify the relief statute.
The Ninth Circuit first identified the problem as one of statutory in-
terpretation. The Ninth Circuit then conducted, what this Note considers,
a "superficial examination" of the statute and determined that the statute
was clear on its face; and that a denial by the BATF was needed in order
for subject matter jurisdiction to exist. While the Ninth Circuit did note
that the appropriations acts suspended part of 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), it did
not define exactly what part of the statute was suspended? 4 So what was
suspended? Was it the jurisdictional grant to the BATF? Was it the de-
200. See supra notes 116-121 and accompanying text.
201. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980); United States v. Dickerson, 310
U.S. 554 (1940).
202. H.R. REp. No. 99-495, at 28 (1986).
203. See supra notes 179-182 and accompanying text.
204. "Thus, the failure to appropriate investigatory funds should be interpreted as a
suspension of that part of section 925(c) which is affected." Burtch v. United States Dep't
of the Treasury, 120 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1997).
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nial requirement needed to invoke judicial review? Or, was it the relief
provision itself? The court determined the statute was clear on its face,
but it raised, and left unanswered, these questions about what affect the
appropriations acts had on the statute. To answer these questions, the
court would have had to know what Congress intended for the appro-
priations acts to do with relation to the relief statute. However, this
Note's position is that it is impossible to ascertain this intention by sim-
ply examining the language of the statute itself and not examining any
other extrinsic materials (like legislative history) that support and reveal
what Congress wanted to accomplish with these subsequent acts.
The Ninth Circuit's approach actually raises other questions that are
outside the scope of this Note, but are interesting nonetheless--questions
of statutory interpretation. There is present in law that age-old debate
concerning legislative history: should legislative history ever be used? If
so, when? What kind of history to use? Can the history create an ambi-
guity in an otherwise clear statute that requires the examination of more
history to clear up the now present ambiguity? The questions could go on
and on. Worthy of mention is Professor Eskridge's article, The New
Textualism, which details how the competing approaches to statutory
interpretation work.2 5 In his article, Professor Eskridge sets out and dis-
cusses the "traditional" approach of statutory interpretation against, what
he calls, the "new textualism," an approach developed by Justice Scalia.
Under the "traditional" approach:
The statute's text is the most important consideration in statutory
interpretation, and a clear text ought to be given effect. Yet the
meaning of a text critically depends upon its surrounding con-
text. Sometimes that context will suggest a meaning at war with
the apparent acontextual meaning suggested by the statute's lan-
guage.... The Supreme Court's traditional resolution of this co-
nundrum has been to consider virtually any contextual evidence,
especially the statute's legislative history, even when the statu-
tory text has an apparent "plain meaning."
Whereas under the "new textualism":
205. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990); see
also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3-37 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
(providing a concise, but effective discussion of the competing approaches); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 61 (1994).
206. Id.
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Once the Court has ascertained a statute's plain meaning, con-
sideration of legislative history becomes irrelevant. Legislative
history should not even be consulted to confirm the apparent
meaning of a statutory text. Such confirmation comes, if any is
needed, from examination of the structure of the statute, inter-
pretations given similar statutory provisions, and canons of
statutory construction.0 7
Professor Eskridge does find some validity in both of these approaches.
What approach did the Ninth Circuit take? It would appear that the
Ninth Circuit's approach would fall under Professor Eskridge's "new
textualism." However, this Note's position has not been that there was
something ambiguous in the relief statute where legislative history was
needed to clear it up; rather, it is that the affirmative actions by Congress
in the form of appropriations acts have in effect changed the relief statute
as it once existed. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit acknowledges that the
appropriations acts have affected 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). Then given this
disparity between the statutory language and the subsequent acts of Con-
gress, the court should have examined legislative history to answer the
very questions it raised. And, in examining the legislative history, it
should have examined the appropriations acts in conjunction with the
legislative history behind the relief provision and the effect this had on
the statute. If the court had conducted such an examination, it should
have come to the same conclusion--Congress eliminated the BATE from
the equation and shifted the task for determining relief to the judiciary
via original jurisdiction.
The Third Circuit's holding that the appropriations acts did not re-
peal 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) is consistent with the modification proposal set
forth in this Note. It is a general maxim that repeals by implication are
"strongly" disfavored."' However, when the Third Circuit conducted its
review of the appropriations acts, it too failed to examine all the relevant
legislative history that would have displayed a true congressional intent
of modification. In addition, it seems somewhat disingenuous that the
Third Circuit began by satisfying itself first that the appropriations acts
did not work to repeal the statute. In phrasing the question as whether
Congress intended to repeal the statute by implication, because repeals
by implications are so strongly disfavored, the court virtually guaranteed
itself of being able to reach the exhaustion of remedies issue. In other
words, the Third Circuit predetermined the outcome by the test it chose
207. Id. at 623-24.
208. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373-74.
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to determine subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, the Third Circuit applied
the repeal by implication doctrine correctly; however, this approach
should not have been used because Congress did intend to alter 18
U.S.C. § 925(c) through the appropriations acts. When a court is decid-
ing whether to excuse a party from the exhaustion of remedies require-
ment, it is weighing equitable considerations. These very considerations
are implicit in the modification approach advanced in this Note."° There-
fore, the Third Circuit reached the correct result, allowing district courts
to determine relief questions, but with the incorrect approach.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note has traced firearms legislation from the 1930s to the pres-
ent. With this legislation Congress has placed disabilities on felons in the
United States by depriving them of the privilege to possess firearms.
Congress recognized that the strict application of these laws disadvan-
taged some individuals Who posed no danger to the public by reason of
firearms possession. Therefore, Congress created a way for deserving
individuals to gain relief from firearms disabilities. And, Congress modi-
fied this ability numerous times.
However, even given this strong concern, Congress, through appro-
priations acts, eliminated funding to the BATF to act upon applications
for relief from firearms disabilities submitted by individuals. This has
created controversy over what exactly Congress intended to achieve with
the appropriations acts.
It has been this Note's position that the circuit courts have miscon-
strued Congress' true intent with the enactment of the appropriations act.
In trying to determine if courts had subject matter jurisdiction to review
non-actions on the part of the BATF, the courts missed what Congress'
intent really was. There was no need to look at this issue solely as one of
judicial review. Just as the appropriations acts eliminated the BATE from
the relief provision, so too did the acts eliminate the ability to review.
However, had any of these courts examined the legislative history of the
relief provision in conjunction with the appropriations acts, they would
have uncovered the answer: modification and original jurisdiction.
RONALD C. GRIFFIN
209. See supra Section IV. C.
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